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The semi-rentier state hypothesis 
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ABSTRACT  
This article offers an alternative explanation of the ‘Greek crisis’ by using the rentier-state 
theory. Past explanations referred to domestic pitfalls of the Greek economic 
development or to external constraints such as the incomplete architecture of the 
Eurozone. Without rejecting these interpretations, we offer a complementary 
interpretation underlining the facility and large scale with which external funds have 
flowed into Greece. This pattern was reminiscent of cases of resource-rich countries of 
the developing world and have created a semi-rentier state. External resources have 
spread a ‘rentier mentality’ among state actors and a ‘get-rich-quick mentality’ among 
business entrepreneurs and interest groups. Political decisions were characterised by risk-
averse attitudes, while private actors spent their energy in seeking political protection 
rather than in initiating new enterprises. Three factors that played a significant role in 
shaping the Greek crisis and continue to plague Greece are foreign loans, EU funds and 
tax evasion.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Greece became the epicenter of Europe’s debt crisis after Wall Street imploded in 2008. 
In 2009, the country was shut out from borrowing in the financial markets and by early 
2010 faced bankruptcy. To avert a catastrophe that would make a European Union (EU) 
Member-State insolvent, endanger banks in Germany and France, and also wipe out the 
salaries, pensions and savings of Greek citizens, the so-called troika — the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission — issued a 
bailout of €110bn. Financial support came with strict conditions in a sequence of 
Economic Adjustment Programs imposed on Greece by the troika: lenders demanded 
deep budget cuts and steep tax increases. They also required the introduction of a 
number of ‘structural reforms’, reducing red tape and deregulating markets.  In 2012, the 
country received a second bailout of €130bn coupled with demands for fundamental 
changes in the public sector. Finally, in August 2015, the eurozone countries agreed to 
give Greece a third bailout, of up to €86bn, on the condition of further reforms, including 
extensive privatisation of public assets and more flexibility in the labor market. Despite 
much progress in curbing the fiscal deficit and some important structural reforms, the 
country's GDP has shrunk by a quarter in six years, exports remained stagnant and 
unemployment rose to over 25 percent. In short, all three bailouts largely ended in 
failure.  
 
Graph 1. Public Debt of Greece relative to its GDP (%) 1980-2016 
 
 
 
 
In the remaining of this article, we survey and evaluate explanations of the Greek crisis 
and then present a brief survey of the literature on the rentier state theory, before 
focusing on our explanation.  Our main argument is that Greece is a semi-rentier state. 
We argue that governance failures of Greece before and after the onset of the crisis 
resulted from the impact of large external rents on weak state institutions. 
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2. Explanations of the crisis in Greece 
 
There are several explanations of the Greek crisis which can be classified into two 
alternative and rather stereotypical perspectives. The first, underlines the importance of 
external factors. Joseph E. Stiglitz has argued that the main cause of the crisis was the 
creation of the euro. When the obstacle of exchange-rate variability was removed, large 
quantities of capital flowed from low-interest-rate countries of the European North to 
high-interest-rate countries of the European South. Those capital flows financed excessive 
government consumption in Greece and a housing bubble in Spain (Stiglitz, 2016). Paul 
Krugman, another Nobel laureate, agrees: “Yes, there are big failings in Greece’s 
economy, its politics and no doubt its society. But those failings aren’t what caused the 
crisis that is tearing Greece apart... No, the origins of this disaster lie farther north, in 
Brussels, Frankfurt and Berlin, where officials created a deeply — perhaps fatally — 
flawed monetary system” (Krugman, 2012). 
 
The second strand of explanations focuses on domestic factors. There is an endless 
number of arguments ranging from the perennial structural problems of the Greek 
economy and fiscal mismanagement since the 1980s to the prevalence of populism and 
clientelistic practices after Greece’s transition to democracy (1974).  
 
Takis S. Pappas, has argued that a pattern of periodic crises, taking the form of downward 
spirals, periodically drag Greece to the brink of the abyss. Pappas recognizes four such 
spirals, which have nearly destroyed Greece since the end of the 19the century (Pappas, 
2016). The first was in 1893-1910, the second in 1935-1952, and the third in 1961-1975. 
The fourth spiral appeared in 2009 and continues to this day. The spirals were owed to 
the periodic de-legitimation of democracy, itself resulting from a combination of 
unsuitable political leaderships, a shallow parliamentary framework and a weak and 
insecure middle class.  
 
George B. Dertilis has argued that the Greek crisis has resulted from a sequence of high 
defense spending, over-indebtedness of the Greek state and the state’s low capacity to 
raise taxes. This was not new but has occurred more than once in the past. Whenever this 
sequence materialises, the Greek economy slides into a downward spiral, which leads to 
sovereign default (Dertilis 2016).  
 
Stathis Kalyvas interprets the latest crisis in Greece as the most recent stage in a series of 
seven successive historical cycles in 1821-2015 (Kalyvas 2015). Each cycle starts with an 
overambitious aim which Greek elites set to themselves. The aim is usually achieved, yet 
each achievement contains the seeds of its own destruction. For example, Greece’ entry 
into the Eurozone, in 2001, contained seeds of such destruction, the near-sovereign 
default of 2010. In this scheme, a catastrophe also serves as a springboard for setting a 
new higher aim, shaped by national elites.  
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Another explanation relying on Greece’s domestic political and economic development 
has been offered by Francis Fukuyama who argues that Greece’s urbanisation and 
modernisation were not accompanied by concomitant industrialisation. The lack of 
availability of jobs in the industry, led Greeks to seek public sector jobs, while politicians 
conveniently created electoral bases through providing such job opportunities to their 
political clients (Fukuyama, 2014). Public employment mushroomed, as elites used it as a 
tool to mobilize voters. Thus, Greece’s economic development was constrained by the 
vagaries of its political development.  
 
A third strand consists of explanations containing a mix of domestic and external factors 
and illuminating the interaction between the two. For instance, it is argued that Greece’s 
entry into the Eurozone, while its economy remained essentially unreformed, depressed 
the funding cost of the Greek economy.  In turn, the availability of funds at low-interest 
rates in Eurozone’s stable monetary environment dampened incentives to reform in the 
Greek state and economy (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2013).  
 
The merits of the above explanations notwithstanding, it seems that they underplay the 
importance of a particular historical legacy or tradition which since 1945 has tied Greece 
to external actors, such as advanced Western economies, and since 1981, to the EU. The 
relevant ties between Greece and the West are not typical dependency-style ties and we 
do not claim that the case of Greece can be interpreted through theories of dependency.  
Although there is much debate on the causes of the Greek crisis, there is far less research 
on the causes of Greece's failure to recover. In fact, there are roughly two views - again 
along the line of external and domestic causes. The first blames the failure to the 
overoptimistic predictions for potential growth rates as well as a miscalculation of fiscal 
multipliers by the IMF (Bi et al., 2013). The second view emphasises the reluctance of the 
Greek governments to implement ‘structural reforms’. In fact, the two explanations are 
complementary. In the words of IMF Managing Director Lagarde's words: “Greece cannot 
just continuously tag along and expect that things will be sorted out. The Greek leaders 
will need to take more ownership of reestablishing their country” (Micklethwait, 2016). 
However, none of these views offers a persuasive answer on why the Greek crisis has 
persisted for so long and why Greece did not recover as Portugal, Spain and Ireland. Were 
neoliberal reforms imposed on the country the wrong recipe and doomed to fail? Or 
should Greek politicians bear the blame for failing to get the ‘ownership’ of the reform 
agenda? This article offers an alternative explanation of why Greece falsified most 
predictions about the crisis resolution by using rentier state theory.  
 
A main  point is that the country has a long tradition of receiving and counting on rents 
coming from abroad. More concretely, after the end of the Second World War, Greece 
received generous economic support from the USA through the Marshall Plan (1947-51). 
According to one estimate, by 1950, half of Greece’s GDP came from the Marshall Plan 
(Judt, 2007, p.96-97). The security dimension of U.S. aid was strengthened when Greece 
joined the NATO alliance in 1952 and continued uninterrupted throughout the Cold War 
years. A similar reliance on foreign injections of funds – this time for investment – would 
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reappear later on, when Greece joined the European Communities (1981), and would 
continue into the 1990s and the 2000s (Graph 1). 
 
 
Graph 2. Grants from the United States and the European Union as a Percent of 
Greece’s GDP 1946-2013 
 
Source: Carmen M. Reinhart and Christopher Trebesch, ‘The Pitfalls of External Dependence: Greece 1829-
2015’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, September 2015, p. 317  
(https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/the-pitfalls-of-external-dependence-greece-1829-2015/) 
 
Indeed, a salient tradition has been a propensity of Greek governments to look for and 
rely on rents in the form of funds increasingly injected to the Greek economy from the 
European Union. Since the late 1980s, the flow of EU transfers was planned and 
programmed in Brussels, in a sequence of large-scale frameworks of financial support to 
EU’s comparatively weak economies and regions (e.g., Greece, Portugal, some regions of 
Italy and Spain). Examples of frameworks were the Mediterranean Operational Programs 
(MOPs), the Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) and the still on-going National 
Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs). 
 
Since 1981, Greece has continuously received large injections of targeted financial aid 
from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), 
the Cohesion Funds and of course other funds earmarked for EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), the total of which tended on the average to exceed 2 per cent of Greece’s 
annual GDP (Liargovas et al. 2016, p.11). It is telling, for example, that while in 1984 the 
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net transfers from the EU to Greece amounted to 2.3 percent of the Greek GDP, in 1994 
they had reached 4.6 percent making Greece the largest net recipient of EU funds among 
all EU Member States (Tsoukalis 1997, Table 9.1). Notably, the sum total of transfers from 
the EU to Greece was 21 bn Euros in 2000-2006 and 20 bn Euros in 2007-2013, while it is 
expected that for 2014-2020 transfers will total 16bn Euros (Axt, 2016, p. 23). 
 
It was also in the post-war period that another tradition was inaugurated, namely the 
propensity of Greek policy-makers to attempt spurring economic growth by boosting 
domestic demand. They tended to increase wages, salaries and pensions, even if 
increases harmed the economic competitiveness of Greece in the international economic 
environment, as it happened in the decade preceding the Greek crisis, in 2001-2010. 
Moreover, successive governments tended to practice clientelism through 
indiscriminately recruiting new employees to the public sector and dispensing social 
transfers, such as pensions or welfare benefits, to favored interest groups. 
 
In view of the above, it is not surprising that since at least the early 1980s, governments 
have incurred state budget deficits. In other words, institutional and socio-economic 
arrangements in Greece have evolved along the aforementioned traditions and the 
country has tended to incur debts and live off rents. 
 
 
3. The Rentier State theory 
 
The concept of the ‘rentier state’ was introduced by Hossein Mahdavy in his study of pre-
revolutionary Iran (Mahdavy, 1970). It was later adopted by Middle Eastern experts in 
their analyses of the impact of oil windfalls on development. In its simplest form, the 
‘rentier state’ is defined as the state that receives from “foreign individuals, concerns or 
governments” and on a regular basis substantial amounts of external economic rents 
(Mahdavy, 1970, p. 428).  
 
For Mahdavy, the period 1951-6 was a ‘landmark’ in the history of the Middle East. The 
nationalisation of the oil industry led to a ‘fortuitous etatism’: massive amounts of money 
(external rent) flooded into state coffers. Massive expenditure followed and such inflows 
of money should have led to development. For Mahdavy the “most crucial problems that 
need to be studied is to explain why the oil exporting countries, in spite of the 
extraordinary resources that [we]re available to them, have not been among the fastest 
growing countries in the world” (Mahdavy 1970, p. 432-434).  
 
Mahdavy’s idea was developed further in the 1980s by Hazim Beblawi and Giacomo 
Luciani who claimed that this “windfall of wealth of unprecedented magnitude in such 
short time” had had a strong impact upon the nature of Arab states (Beblawi, 1990, 52 nd 
62). Luciani argued that the main characteristic of the rentier state is that external rent 
liberates the state from the need to extract income through taxes from the domestic 
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economy. He makes a distinction between two ‘types’ of states: the ‘production state’ 
that relies on taxation of the domestic economy for its income and the ‘allocation state’ 
that is the main source of revenue itself in the domestic economy. For Luciani, the 
‘production state’ aims at increasing economic growth since more growth means more 
revenues, while the ‘allocation state’ fails to design and implement “anything deserving 
the appellation of economic policy”. Its main activity is to allocate or distribute wealth.  
 
Rentier-state theorists argued that the economic behavior of a rentier state “embodies a 
break in the work-reward causation” as oil revenues become a “serious blow to the ethics 
of work” (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987, pp. 52 and 62). In short, the rent undermines 
economic development, encouraging passive, non-developmental, attitudes.  
 
For Hossein Mahdavy, the reliance on external rent explains the reform inertia noted in 
many Arab countries: “Instead of attending to the task of expediting the basic socio-
economic transformations, they devote the greater part of their resources to jealously 
guarding the status quo” (Mahdavy, 1970, p. 443).  Massive amounts of rent flowing into 
the state budgets, permit governments to purchase the consent of the citizens without 
paying the political price of imposing taxes. In turn this ‘tax effect’ makes the population 
less likely to demand accountability from government institutions (Ross, 2001, p. 332). 
The state becomes simply an ‘allocative mechanism’. Moreover, by not resorting to 
taxation, the rentier state unwittingly diminishes its own administrative capacity. 
   
Since the main activity of the government in rentier states is to allocate income and 
wealth, the political opposition focuses on how these are distributed. This shapes the 
entire political debate, as interest groups are formed with their main objective to receive 
more from the state budget. This reflects the “‘iron law’ of rent: Wherever a rent is to be 
found, a rent seeker will be there trying to get it” (Mueller, 1989, p. 241).  
 
Hence, the rentier state theory claims that the external rent has negative economic and 
political consequences. The research on these consequences is fragmented in a large 
number, literally hundreds, of studies, mainly in the fields of political science and 
economics. However, “economists and political scientists seem unaware of each other’s’ 
contributions, and political scientists are often divided by their area of specialties” (Ross, 
1999, p. 299).  
 
Rentier state theorists claim that resource wealth dependence creates a ‘rentier 
mentality’ characterised by the shortsightedness of both state and private actors. The 
external rents create myopic and risk-averse attitudes among policy-makers and a ‘get-
rich-quick mentality’ among business-people. Excessive optimism and short-sighted 
euphoria lead to paralysis. As a result, crucial decisions are delayed and developmental 
strategies remain unimplemented. In rentier states the route to personal wealth lays 
through political influence. As a result, energy is spent in seeking political protection 
rather than in initiating new enterprises that could create wealth (Ross, 1999, p. 310-
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312). Societies are characterised by the 'perilous influence of privileged classes, sectors, 
client networks or interest groups” (Ross, 2001, p. 308).  
 
As the state is largely freed from the need to levy domestic taxes, institutional capacity 
remains weak. Rentier states try to do too much too soon, leaving the administration 
over-extended. Long-planning is based on limited information – since the tax-collection 
institutions are left weak and underdeveloped.    
 
Within the last twenty years, there was a proliferation of studies, expanding rentier state 
theory at three levels. First, several researchers included in the external rent and other 
primary products apart from oil and natural gas, like minerals, precious stones and 
agricultural commodities as well as transportation fees (e.g. the Suez Channel) and 
foreign aid (Blodgett Bermeo, 2011). Secondly, a number of studies have widened the 
rentier-state theory beyond the Middle East, trying to explain a wider range of maladies 
in Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet Union (Yates, 1996, Karl, 1997). And thirdly 
and most importantly, many studies added a number of other negative characteristics of 
the rentier states, including the political impact of resource endowments on the quality of 
state institutions, government accountability and even the incidence of civil war (Ross, 
2015).  
 
Terry Karl has argued that the critical factor is the existence of a weak state at the time of 
the discovery of the external rent (Karl, 1997). Developed countries like Norway and 
Australia but also poorer countries like Botswana already possessed democratic 
institutions and strong bureaucracies before the discovery of their mineral windfalls. 
Thus, these countries had countervailing interest groups that ensured that rents were 
well managed and properly used for developmental purposes.  Another argument links 
the external rent to the evolution of institutions. David Wiens argues that weak 
institutions lead to rent-dependency which in turn undermines the improvement of 
institutional quality (Wiens, 2013). And Michael Ross claims that the external rent induces 
politicians to dismantle well-functioning institutions in order to gain unhindered access to 
resource (Ross, 2001).  
 
Despite the widening of geographical scope of rentier state theory studies, cases from 
Western Europe are almost non-existent. Moreover, apart from foreign aid and fees from 
transport corridors, other money transfers are largely neglected.  
 
Based on the above survey of the literature, we argue that phenomena described by 
rentier state theory were present in Greece before the onset of the crisis and can partly 
explain the difficulties the country faced in implementing reforms according to the 
expectations of its lenders. Our empirical data to support the semi-rentier state 
hypothesis is that Greece since the 1980s received extensive external rents though loans 
and European Union structural funds. Greece’s weak state capacity created a number of 
rentier-state situations, reinforced vested interests and transformed the state to a 
‘distributive’ or ‘allocative’ mechanism.  
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In a situation reminiscent of the ‘Dutch disease’, as applied to the Eurozone crisis, Greece 
received an avalanche of credit in the form of EU funds. How funds were used depended 
on the political economy structure of the recipient country and in turn affected the 
competitiveness of the economy at the receiving end.  Nikos Koutsiaras and Zisis 
Manouzas suggest that in order to understand the causes of the Greek crisis, the Dutch 
disease explanation should be combined with the Samuelson-Balassa effect and the policy 
choices of Greek policy-makers and banks (Koutsiaras and Manouzas 2017). EU funds 
were channeled not to the tradeables but to the non-tradeables sector of the Greek 
economy. The latter sector, already sizeable owing to Greece’s low industrial base and 
inefficient agricultural production, grew after Greece entered the Eurozone (2001). 
Meanwhile, policy-makers, having no incentives to act otherwise, did not exercise wage 
moderation. Until 2008, when it started declining, real GDP growth in Greece increased in 
fits and starts. Enjoying the positive benefits of long-term external credit, policymakers 
did not proceed with structural reforms. Over time and given the constraints of the 
Eurozone, which had cancelled the option of currency devaluation, the competitiveness 
of the Greek economy declined and the balance of payments worsened, as did the public 
deficit.   
 
A typical example of the above pattern was the lack of incentives of policy makers to 
reform the pension system which largely contributed to creating an unmanageable public 
debt that can be interpreted through the lens of historical legacies. More concretely, 
since the end of the Second World War the politics of pensions and social assistance in 
Greece have been shaped by the state’s drive to achieve legitimation after the end of a 
highly divisive civil war (1946-1949). Pension policy was also shaped by pressures exerted 
by strong interest groups, such as the liberal professions and employees of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and banks, on the state to obtain preferential treatment over the rest 
of professions and occupations. Patterns of fragmented and irrationally distributed social 
protection were continued well into the post-1974 period, after Greece’s transition to 
democracy. As Tassos Giannitsis and Stavros Zografakis explain, such trends have resulted 
in an expensive but inefficient and unfair pension system and a porous social safety net 
(Giannitsis and Zografakis, 2016).  
 
Eventually, Greece’s entry into the Eurozone (2001) delayed rather than promoted 
reforms and the delay of reforms worsened Greece’s position in the Eurozone and led to 
fiscal derailment. In the late 2000s such historical legacies of welfare policies combined 
with reckless fiscal policies of successive Greek governments and the global financial crisis 
to bring the Greek economy to a breaking point and render the state unable to manage 
the grave social inequalities brought about the crisis. The necessary rationalisation of an 
irrationally developed welfare state has given way to retrenchment exclusively driven by 
policies of fiscal consolidation.  
 
After the crisis struck, under successive coalition governments of the Right and the Left, 
the politics of pensions reflected pressures from abroad, crystallised in externally-
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imposed austerity policies, while the politically weak outsiders of the welfare system, 
such as precarious workers and the unemployed, were unable to react to welfare 
retrenchment. 
 
 
4. Greece as a semi-rentier state 
 
Despite similarities with rentier states of developing areas of the world, Greece is not a 
typical rentier state. Rent situations do not predominate in the Greek economy and 
economic production resembles the model of a service economy, based on tourism, 
public administration, banking and other services, rather than the model of a typical rent-
based economy. On the other hand, the Greek state is the primary recipient of 
substantive external rent, in the form of loans and subsidies. 
 
More concretely, after ratifying the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) Greece’s preparations to 
abandon the drachma and adopt the euro coincided with a spectacular drop in its 
borrowing costs. Interest rates on 10-year Greek bonds dropped from 24.5 percent to 6.5 
percent between 1993 and 1999 (Nelson et al. 2011, p.3). By the early 2000s, Greece had 
unlimited access to cheap capital, fueled by flush capital markets and investor confidence, 
especially after the country entered the Eurozone in 2001 (Graphs 2 and 3). 
 
Graph 3. Yields on 10-year government bonds 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
As interest rates fell, the Greek government took advantage of cheap credit to increase 
salaries and pensions and offset low tax revenue. It also borrowed to pay for imports 
from abroad. Government budget and trade deficits ballooned during the 2000s (Graph 
4). 
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Graph 4. Greece’s ‘Twin’ Deficits: Budget and Current Account Deficits,  
1999-2009 
 
 
The easiness to find external rent (loans) made the government indifferent to the size of 
taxation revenues. Tax evasion was for many decades a permanent problem in an 
economy characterised by the large presence of self-employed categories of the labor 
force, e.g., shop-keepers and self-employed professionals. While on the average in EU-28 
about 85 percent of all employed people work as salaried employees, the corresponding 
percentage share in Greece is smaller than 75 percent and it is the lowest in EU-28.  
 
Tax evasion became increasingly widespread in the 2000s. The traditional poor capacity of 
the tax administration combined by lax tax enforcement, inefficient tax collection and the 
lack of effective tax dispute resolution mechanisms led to a tax-GDP ratio that was in 
2008 around five percent of GDP lower than the average of the OECD or EU countries 
(Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2013, p. 285-287).  
 
By 2009, almost 60 percent of Greek taxpayers declared incomes below the tax-free 
threshold and did not pay any taxes. These were largely self-employed professionals. In 
personal income taxes Greece ranked 31st among 33 OECD countries. The lack of an 
effective dispute resolution mechanism made matters worse. By 2008, over 150,000 
cases were pending before tax courts, “with each case taking seven to ten years on 
average, to reach a final verdict” (Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2013, p. 292). The Ministry 
of Finance decisions to proceed to regular ‘tax amnesties’ acted as a further motive for 
more tax evasion.  
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Three economists used data from a large bank to assess how much money Greek 
professionals hide (Artavanis et al., 2012). Τhey estimated that 28 billion euros in self-
employed income went untaxed in Greece for 2009, accounting for 31 percent of the 
deficit for 2009 or 48 percent for 2008. They also found that primary tax evading 
occupations were doctors, engineers, private tutors, accountants, financial service agents, 
and lawyers. They estimated that these professions, spent more than 100 percent of their 
declared income on mortgage payment alone. The standard practice in consumer finance 
is to never lend to borrowers such an amount that would lead loan payments to exceed 
30 percent of their monthly income.  Self-employed people on average paid around 82 
percent of their monthly reported income into servicing debt. The only plausible 
explanation is that they were colossally underreporting their income to tax authorities.   
 
The non-rentier part of the state benefited from taxing the population primarily through 
indirect taxation, for example, high taxes imposed on tobacco consumption, fuel and 
heating oil. The ratio of indirect taxes to direct taxes has always been one of the worst in 
Europe (Thomadakis 2006). Then non-rentier part of the state also imposed income tax 
on households and business, albeit with a distinct social bias: tax revenue depended 
disproportionately on income tax paid by the salaried strata, as the liberal professions 
and the self-employed traditionally evaded paying taxes, while Greek authorities 
traditionally tolerated their tax evasion. As there was an over-representation of liberal 
professions among ministerial and parliamentary elites (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2002), 
regardless of which party was in government, there was recurring reluctance on the part 
of the government to tax these groups. 
 
The tax/GDP ratio in Greece increased from around 12 percent in the mid-1960s to about 
23 percent in 2000. However, it then declined to around 20 percent throughout the 2000s 
(Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2013, p. 287). This was the ‘golden period’ of the euro with 
very low interest rates. These were the years that rentier politics in Greece reached a new 
high.    
 
EU membership provided Greece with an external rent, which, as noted above (second 
section of the article), increased considerably from the 1980s to the 1990s. The 
management of EU-funds in pre-crisis Greece was periodically characterised by low levels 
of absorption, but this pattern did not mean that funds were lost for the country. They 
were absorbed with significant delays, while in some cases earmarked funds were 
transferred to the subsequent programme period. Since 1988 with Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs), funds, know-how and best practices have been 
channelled into Greece. Three successive Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) 
followed. And in 2007-2013 numerous projects, included in the first programme period of 
the European Social Fund (ESF), among other sources of EU support, were implemented. 
Overall, while EU funds were not as consequential as they could have be, their constant 
streaming into Greece for at least twenty years before the crisis (1988-2008) has probable 
changed the face of Greek countryside and Greece’s infrastructures. 
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EU membership did not weaken powerful interest groups; in fact, it strengthened them, 
providing a handful of wealthy families – an oligarchy – with new sources of credit and 
cash. Business entrepreneurs running construction companies became very powerful and 
were in a position to enforce rules that favoured them. It is no coincidence that many of 
them used their huge profits to invest in the media. 
 
Since the late 1980s, well-known business people who had their hands on a broad array 
of enterprises that depended heavily on government patronage have also controlled the 
media market. As Nikos Leandros writes, in the newspaper sector “…four leading 
publishing houses controlled 69.7 percent of the market in 2008 compared to 57.3 
percent in 2000, 62.9 percent in 1995 and 59 percent in 1990” (Leandros, 2010, p. 893). 
Media moguls exerted strong political influence. In the words of Pavlos Eleftheriadis, “a 
handful of wealthy families – an oligarchy in all but name – has dominated Greek politics” 
(Eleftheriadis, 2014).  
 
These powerful elites have preserved their positions through control of the media and 
old-fashioned favouritism, sharing the spoils of power and EU money with the country’s 
politicians. A 2006 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Athens, obtained by Wikileaks, noted 
that Greek media outlets “are subsidised by their owners who (…) use [them] primarily to 
exert political and economic influence” (Grey and Kyriakidou, 2012).  
 
EU Structural Funds helped also to create a new type of bourgeoisie through the 
proliferation of specialised agencies, consultancies and educational training centres. All 
the people who run these organisations developed close relationships with politicians and 
bureaucrats and the distribution of EU funds became part of the clientelistic political 
game (Huliaras and Petropoulos, 2016, p. 1340).  
 
 
5. The lame Leviathan 
 
The central accumulation of revenues in rentier states makes government intervention in 
planning, financing and management of economic development unavoidable. The state 
with the ‘power of the purse’ has the ability to create, buy-off or maintain political 
coalitions.  
 
In particular, those in charge of the state have the power to create client groups eh nihilo 
in order to help keep themselves in power. Thus, the political dynamics of state-society 
interaction become rudimentary, one-sided and usually lacking in real-content. Civil 
society is reduced to a number of interest groups that compete for access to the public 
‘purse’.  Thus, rentier states become enormously powerful. They can seek easy solutions 
to problems and challenges without fiscal constraints and without the impediments that a 
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neutral bureaucracy or an active civil society can pose. Everything provided is a result of 
the state’s largesse. 
 
However, the state’s apparent autonomy is a double-edged sword. Etatisme, ranging 
from active participation to production to the setting of prices, leads to an inability of the 
state to effectively regulate the economy and create politically viable structures. 
Bureaucratic institutions are limited to implementing distributive measures (Vandewalle, 
1998, p. 185). Because rulers rely on external rents, they are not compelled to create 
bureaucracies that gather information, extract and redistribute in order to achieve social 
objectives.  
 
The Greek state has been characterised as a ‘colossus with feet of clay’, a large, chaotic, 
inefficient and non-meritocratic administration ‘penetrated’ by political parties and 
distributing favors and contracts on the base of clientelistic relationships (Sotiropoulos 
1993). Over-regulation and legalism dominated state-economy relations, while after 1974 
in the public sector necessary democratisation was limited to the granting of new rights 
to civil servants and establishing new political institutions, such as independent 
regulatory authorities. The state was more accessible to citizens but never became more 
efficient. In other words, institutional reform prevailed over managerial reform (Spanou 
and Sotiropoulos, 2011). Meanwhile, organised interests, such as networks of business 
enterprises in the construction and media sectors, the liberal professions and insiders of 
the labor market, such as employees of state-owned enterprises, focused on rent-
seeking, competing for resources and subsidies. Obviously, organised interests did not 
enjoy the same level of political influence over decision-making, but were nevertheless 
able to carve their own market niches and separate wage and pension regimes. 
 
Thus, the inability of Greece to recover is linked to weak state institutions that were 
further undermined by external rents. Weak institutional capacity of the state was 
combined with blockages to reform emanating from powerful interest groups that 
received significant external rents. Kevin Featherstone has persuasively argued that 
“Greece has displayed a character close to that of une societé bloqué, a political setting of 
stalemate between contending veto players” (Featherstone, 2005, p. 226).  In attempting 
to implement reforms, the Greek governments were entrapped “‘in a stalemate 
bargaining game, unable to offer sufficient incentives to change the process and 
overcome powerful vested interests” In turn, “the political and social power of such 
interests undermine[d] the strength of will and purpose of government itself” 
(Featherstone, 2005, p. 238). The result has been that the Greek state has avoided to tax 
selected categories of the population, acting in a discriminating and clientelistic manner.  
 
Indeed, while parliamentarism in Greece has flourished and has withstood the test of the 
grave economic crisis which erupted in 2009-2010, it does not reflect but a narrow slice of 
Greek social interests. Traditionally, the liberal professions are over-represented in the 
Greek parliament and government. Lawyers, physicians and engineers constitute more 
than half of total Members of Parliament (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, 2004), while many 
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among the rest are political party cadres who had never had a job outside a party 
organisation. It is in this sense that large categories of the population, including labor 
market outsiders and the young, have felt that political representation too is blocked in 
Greece and that representative democracy does not work for them. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The article has sought to question and complement existing explanations of the causes 
and evolution of the crisis in Greece. A first set of explanations over-emphasizes the role 
of external factors, namely the structure of the Eurozone and policy choices of 
international elites. By contrast, a second set of explanations underlines to an 
exaggerated degree the long-term domestic political economy patterns which have set 
Greece apart from other advanced European economies and have led to the crisis 
erupting in 2009-2010.  
 
We have argued that explanations trying to combine external and domestic factors of the 
crisis are more convincing than either of the above two sets. We have turned to rentier 
state theory in order to examine to what extent they may be applicable to the case of 
Greece. While Greece is not comparable to developing economies suffering from the 
resource curse or to the Netherlands experiencing the ‘Dutch disease’, it is true that large 
US and European funds have been frequently flowing into Greece since the end of the 
Second World War.  
External credit, in the forms of the wide availability of low-interest loans combined with 
extensive net transfers from the EU, acquired large proportions and a systematic 
character after Greece joined the European Communities (1981) and increasingly so since 
the country joined the Eurozone (2001).  Such transfers may be understood as the 
functional equivalent of external rents. These rents are not necessarily damaging, if 
combined with strong domestic institutions. However, the Greek state had never 
developed administrative capacities, while market institutions have remained weak too. 
Relying on the flow of rents from abroad, Greek political elites had no incentive to 
proceed with reforms in state-economy relations and efficiency-oriented reforms of 
institutions. Strong interest groups, which also enjoyed increasing living standards as the 
Greek economy became awash with foreign loans and EU funds, never demanded any 
substantive reforms of Greece’s production model either. A combination of a long-
tradition of rent-seeking with weakly developed domestic institutions and the negative 
effects of the global crisis of 2008 constitutes the kernel of the explanation of the Greek 
crisis offered in this article.  
Το sum up, this article has offered an alternative explanation of the crisis in Greece by 
using rentier-state theory. Past explanations referred to fiscal mismanagement by Greek 
governments prior to 2010; the structural problems of Greek economy, including lack of 
international competitiveness and weakness of the tradeable sector; the prevalence of 
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populism after Greece’s transition to democracy (1974) and statist policies stifling the 
Greek economy; the introduction of the euro; and neoliberalism using Greece as a testing 
ground for new policies.  
 
However, what is much less underlined is Greece's dependence on foreign loans and 
external subsidies which have led to a semi-rentier state. Without claiming that loans and 
subsidies bring about the same effects as oil or other such resources, which anyway 
Greece lacks, it is argued that such external resources created a “rentier mentality” 
characterised by the shortsightedness of state actors and a “get-rich-quick mentality” 
among business-people.  Political decisions were characterised by myopic and risk-averse 
attitudes. Private actors spent their energy in seeking political protection rather than in 
initiating new enterprises.  
 
As the state neglected the need to reform its structure and management, its institutional 
capacity remained weak. Excessive optimism and short-sighted euphoria led to 
institutional paralysis. Since the early 1980s, the availability of external rents undermined 
economic development, encouraging passive, non-developmental, attitudes. This article 
has supported the argument that three factors that played a significant role in shaping 
the Greek crisis and continue to plague Greece today: foreign loans, EU funds and tax 
evasion in order to offer an alternative explanation of Greek economy’s failure to adapt 
to European norms.   
 
After the crisis started, Greece managed to streamline its fiscal policy and indeed in 2014 
and again in 2016 achieved budget surpluses. In the meantime, rent-seeking tradition 
waned, as funds transferred to Greece in the context of the Economic Adjustment 
Programs of 2010, 2012 and 2015 were accompanied by conditionalities. The latter 
included reforms in the management of public finances, taxation, the public and banking 
sectors as well as the product and labor markets. Reforms were very unevenly 
implemented and started to produce positive economic effects, albeit accompanied by 
negative social effects, such as extensive poverty and social exclusion. 
However, the Greek political system has not followed suit. Even after they were obliged 
to pursue austerity policies, Greek governments of the Right and the Left periodically 
tried to exempt favored occupational groups from austerity measures and also to 
continue the hiring of political party clients to the public sector. There has anyway been 
continuous pressure from political clienteles, such as voters of one or the other political 
party, for such preferential treatment. Mentalities and behaviors of Greek elites and the 
population need time to change. 
The explanation of the crisis pursued in this article may be relevant to Greece but could 
also be useful for the theoretical understanding of other crises. Based on the case of 
Greece one could argue that long-term economic patterns, such as rent-seeking on the 
part of state actors, combined with weak institutions and pressed by external constraints, 
such as the global financial crisis, produce crises of long duration and large scale. 
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